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Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah
In a recent article,1 Anne Layne-Farrar and Richard Stark argue that a commitment to license
patents essential to an industry standard (standards-essential patents or SEPs) on terms that are
“fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) does not require SEP holders to “provide
licenses to any and all parties requesting them”. The authors argue against such a “License to
All” requirement on the basis of antitrust law, patent law and principles of economic welfare.
Yet, as they eventually point out, FRAND commitments are not created by antitrust law, patent
law or free-standing economic principles, but by written policy documents that are adopted by
standards development organizations (SDOs). I concur with Layne-Farrar’s and Stark’s reasoning
that
what exactly a particular SDO policy requires of SEP holders is a question of
contract interpretation, which depends on the language of the particular policy at
issue. An across-the-board interpretation of FRAND obligations that applies in all
cases is not possible.2
In this short response, I offer some additional thoughts regarding the contractual aspects of the
“License to All” question and conclude that, while there is no general rule applicable to all SDO
FRAND policies, there are good reasons to interpret many such policies as imposing a “License to
All” requirement.
The Nondiscrimination Prong of FRAND
The “License to All” issue arises from the nondiscrimination (ND) prong of the FRAND
commitment.3 SDOs with FRAND policies require that SEP holders grant licenses to implementers
of their standards on “nondiscriminatory” terms. But what does this mean in the context of
complex global supply chains in which different firms produce components, subsystems and end
products. Must a SEP holder grant a license to every firm that requests one, no matter where in
the supply chain it fits? Or may a SEP holder choose to grant licenses only to end product
manufacturers (e.g., smartphone or automobile makers), and refuse to license component (e.g.,
chipset) makers?
1

Anne Layne-Farrar & Richard Stark, FRAND does not mean license-to-all in the US, Intell. Asset Mgt., Sep. 28, 2020,
https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/license-all-access-all.
2
Id.
3
See Jorge L. Contreras & Anne Layne-Farrar, Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 186, 200-02 (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3138578.
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The Financial Impact of Level Discrimination
The answer to this question is an important one, as a variety of commercial and legal factors
enable SEP holders to charge higher rates when they license to end product manufacturers than
to component manufacturers. In the words of one prominent industry attorney, licensing SEPs to
end product manufacturers is “humongously” more lucrative than licensing them to chip
makers.4 So there is a clear financial incentive to interpret the nondiscrimination prong of FRAND
to allow licensing only at this level in the supply chain (what has been termed “level
discrimination”).
On the other hand, a “License to All” requirement would allow component manufacturers to
obtain SEP licenses, which would likely eliminate the need for end product manufacturers to
obtain their own licenses under those SEPs thanks to the patent exhaustion doctrine (i.e., to the
extent that a chipset embodies a patented invention, manufacturers that incorporate the chip
into other products do not need a license).5
Layne-Farrar and Stark argue that a “License to All” requirement undercompensates SEP holders
and thereby violates patent law, “which guarantees a reasonable royalty based on the use of the
technology”. But this assertion is not accurate, as U.S. law does not guaranty patent holders a
royalty floor in commercial transactions.6 The real question is whether “License to All” is required
by the FRAND policies that SEP holders voluntarily accept when they join particular SDOs. If so,
then arguments about whether or not such policies will over- or under-compensate SEP holders
are largely irrelevant – SEP holders, like everyone else, must abide by the agreements that they
make.
What do the Policies Say?
If “License to All” commitments depend on the language of SDO FRAND policies, then it is
important to consider the language of these policies when determining whether a “License to
All” obligation exists. Policies fall into three categories in this respect: (1) those that clearly
require “License to All”, (2) those that clearly allow level discrimination (what Layne-Farrar and
Stark call “Access to All”), and (3) those that are silent or ambiguous on this point.
An example of a category (1) policy is the one adopted in 2015 by IEEE-SA, the group responsible
for computer networking standards such as Ethernet and Wi-Fi. It requires SEP holders to commit
to make licenses available to manufacturers of “[a]ny product (eg, component, sub-assembly, or
end product) or service that conforms to any mandatory or optional portion of a normative clause
4

FTC v. Qualcomm, 411 F.Supp.3d 658, 754, 758, 796 (N.D. Cal., 2019), rev’d on other grounds, 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.
2019).
5
Jorge L. Contreras, “No License, No Problem” – Is Qualcomm’s Ninth Circuit Antitrust Victory a Patent Exhaustion
Defeat?, PATENTLY-O BLOG (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3695603.
6
The relevant statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284, merely stipulates a “reasonable royalty” as a measure of damages for patent
infringement.
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of an IEEE Standard.”7 This policy’s explicit reference to components and sub-assemblies pretty
clearly establishes a “License to All” obligation for SEP holders. Layne-Farrar and Stark agree that
the IEEE policy “can be read as supporting a broad obligation.”8
Other U.S.-based SDOs have defined their FRAND requirements to mean that SEP holders must
make licenses available to “all applicants”. In the case of the Alliance for Telecommunications
Industry Solutions (ATIS) and the Telecommunications Industry Association (“TIA”) (U.S.-based
organizational partners of 3GPP and 3GPP2, respectively), the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California held that these “all applicants” requirements imposed “License to All”
obligation on ATIS and TIA members.9
As for category (2) policies that expressly allow level discrimination or disavow “License to All”
obligations, I am not aware of, nor do Layne-Farrar and Stark identify, any SDO that has included
such a disavowal in its FRAND policy.
I believe it is fair to say that most SDO FRAND policies fall into category (3) – they are silent or
ambiguous as to a “License to All” obligation. In these cases, one must rely on extrinsic or “parol”
evidence to determine the meaning of the policy and the existence (or not) of such an obligation.
Determining the “Intent” of the Parties
Much SDO policy language is notoriously vague, a fact that prompted the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to complain that one such policy suffered from “a staggering lack of defining
details.”10 While some SDOs improved their policies in the aftermath of such criticisms, many did
not. As a result, SDO participants and courts alike must try to discern the intent of the parties to
the SDO “contract”.
One way to clarify this intent is to ask people involved in drafting the policies what they meant.
But this is not always fruitful, as there are often conflicting recollections, particularly when
policies were drafted years ago and large amounts of money are now at stake. For example, the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) policy does not clearly establish
whether “License to All” is required or not (as Layne-Farrar and Stark seem to acknowledge). In
an effort to clarify this uncertainty, one former Director-General of ETSI wrote in 2017 that under
the ETSI policy, “all third parties who want to implement the standard, including manufacturers
of components such as chipsets, are … entitled to a license, if they seek one”.11 But this statement
led to a swift rebuttal by another expert who had participated in drafting the ETSI policy; he
7

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws 6.2 (Aug. 2020).
Layne-Farrar and Stark, supra note 1.
9
FTC v. Qualcomm, Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, Order Granting FTC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 6, 2018), vacated on other grounds 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir., 2020).
10
Rambus v. Infineon, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
11
Karl Heinz Rosenbrock, Why the ETSI IPR Policy Requires Licensing to All (Aug. 2017),
http://www.fair-standards.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Why-the-ETSI-IPR-Policy- Requires-Licensing-to-All
Karl-Heinz-Rosenbrock 2017.pdf.
8
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claimed that “ETSI has never compelled essential IPR owners to grant licenses to any company
that requests one, or to grant licenses at the component level”.12 The “meaning” of the ETSI
policy remains uncertain today.
Understandings of SDO Participants
When SDO policy language is ambiguous and the drafters are at odds, U.S. courts may look to the
on-the-ground practices, understandings and norms of SDO participants.13 For example, in
Rambus v. Infineon, a SEP holder was accused of fraud based on its alleged concealment of SEPs
from an SDO.14 The district court found, based on a literal reading of the SDO’s policy, that no
duty of disclosure was imposed on the SDO’s members. But the court also found that SDO
participants shared a common understanding that they should disclose patents necessary to
practice the SDO’s standards. As such, the court recognized a legal duty to disclose
notwithstanding the policy’s silence on the issue.15 A similar result was reached in Qualcomm v.
Broadcom, in which a duty to disclose was found based on informal norms and expectations of
SDO participants in the face of an equally vague SDO policy.16
Historical Evidence
In addition to the recollections of policy drafters and community practices, courts may look to
the historical record to illuminate the meaning that should be ascribed to SDO policy language.
SDO policies relating to intellectual property were not created in a vacuum. As I have previously
shown, FRAND commitments were being used as remedial measures in patent antitrust cases
since the 1940s.17 Numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases reviewed these commitments, which
often required patent holders to grant licenses to “all applicants”,18 meaning that any party
requesting such a license should be granted one. While the circumstances of these remedial
orders were different than the voluntary FRAND commitments of today, the drafters of the first
SDO FRAND policies were clearly aware of these earlier commitments and were likely influenced
by the judicial decisions interpreting them. In fact, it is striking that the same “all applicants”
language used in these historical orders is also used in FRAND policies adopted by SDOs such as
ATIS and TIA, which have been found to impose “License to All” obligations on SDO participants.

12

Bertram Huber, Why the ETSI IPR Policy Does Not and Has Never Required Compulsory ‘License to All’: A Rebuttal
to Karl Heinz Rosenbrock at 2 Sep. 20, 2017). But see Karl Heinz Rosenbrock, Licensing At All Levels Is The Rule Under
The ETSI IPR Policy: A Response to Dr. Bertram Huber 6 (Nov. 3, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064894 (further rebuttal).
13
See Jorge L. Contreras, From Private Ordering to Public Law: The Legal Framework Governing Standards-Essential
Patents, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 211 (2017) (discussing the use of private arrangements to form legal obligations).
14
Rambus v. Infineon, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
15
Id. at 1098.
16
548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
17
Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard-Setting and Antitrust through
a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39 (2015).
18
Id. at 74-78.
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Conclusion
FRAND commitments are creations of written policy documents and contract law. Accordingly,
the existence of a “License to All” obligation under a FRAND commitment must arise from the
relevant policy language. Numerous SDO policies expressly impose “License to All” requirements.
Some SDO policies are ambiguous with respect to this requirement and such ambiguities should
be resolved based on an examination of extrinsic evidence including the intentions of policy
drafters, the shared understandings of SDO participants, and the historical precedents for such
policies. In many cases, an examination of these factors should lead to the conclusion that
“License to All” is, indeed, required by the relevant policies. The only sure way to prevent the
imposition of “License to All” obligations on SDO participants is to draft clear policy language
expressly disavowing such obligations and permitting level discrimination in SEP licensing.
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